Some Implications

The realization that Andrews must have had fighters on alert has many implications. For one thing, if Andrews had fighters on alert, then it would seem likely that McGuire did too, so that fighters to protect New York City did not have to be scrambled from Otis Air Force Base on Cape Cod.

National security expert (and former ABC producer) James Bamford says, moreover, that NEADS was also able to call on 'alert fighter pilots at National Guard units at Burlington, Vermont; Atlantic City, New Jersey; . . . and Duluth, Minnesota' (258).

If so, then there were at least 7 bases from which NEADS could have scrambled fighters, not merely two, as the official story has it (158-59). And if that part of the official story is a lie, then it seems likely that that story as a whole is a lie.

This conclusion will be reinforced by our examination of the Commission's treatment of United Airlines Flight 93.


THE COMMISSION'S TREATMENT OF UNITED AIRLINES FLIGHT 93

Flight 93 presented the 9/11 Commission with a different task. In relation to the previous flights, the Commission's task was to explain why the US military did not intercept and shoot them down.

With regard to Flight 93, the Commission had to convince us that the military did not shoot it down. It sought to do this not by refuting the evidence, which is considerable, that the airliner was shot down, but by simply constructing a new story intended to show that the US military could not have shot down Flight 93.

The Military's Ignorance of the Hijacking

The Commission makes two major claims about Flight 93. The first one is that: 'By the time the military learned about the flight, it had crashed' (229). The centrality of this claim is shown by the fact that it is repeated, almost mantra-like, throughout the Commission's chapter. [20]

Incredible FAA Incompetence

The main support for this claim is provided by yet another tale of amazing incompetence by FAA officials.

At 9:28, we are told, the traffic controller in Cleveland heard 'sounds of possible screaming' and noticed that Flight 93 had descended 700 feet, but he did nothing. Four minutes later, he heard a voice saying: 'We have a bomb on board.' This controller, not being completely brain dead, finally notified his supervisor, who in turn notified FAA headquarters.

Later, however, when Cleveland asked Herndon whether the military had been called, the Commission claims, Herndon 'told Cleveland that FAA personnel well above them in the chain of command had to make the decision to seek military assistance and were working on the issue' (227).

To accept this account, we must believe that, on a day on which there had already been attacks by hijacked airliners, officials at FAA headquarters had to debate whether a hijacked airliner with a bomb on board was important enough to disturb the military.

And we must believe that they were still debating this question 13 minutes later, when, we are told, the following conversation between Herndon and FAA headquarters occurred:

Command Center: Uh, do we want to think, uh, about scrambling aircraft?

FAA Headquarters: Oh, God, I don't know.

Command Center: Uh, that's a decision somebody's gonna have to make probably in the next ten minutes. (228)

But obviously the decision was that the military should not be disturbed, because 14 minutes later, at 10:03, when Flight 93 crashed in Pennsylvania, we are told, 'no one from FAA headquarters [had yet] requested military assistance regarding United 93' (229).

We are expected to believe, in other words, that FAA officials acted like complete idiots.


Worthless Teleconferences

In any case, besides arguing, by means of this tale of incredible incompetence, that the FAA never formally notified the military about Flight 93, the Commission argued that there was also no informal notification during any teleconference. In this case, not being able to argue that the teleconferences began too late, the Commission argued that they were worthless.

Its summary statement said: 'The FAA, the White House, and the Defense Department each initiated a multiagency teleconference before 9:30. [But] none of these teleconferences . . . included the right officials from both the FAA and the Defense Department' (211).

Let us begin with the teleconference initiated by the National Military Command Center. Why was it worthless for transmitting information from the FAA to the military? Because, we are told, Pentagon operators were unable to get the FAA on the line. This is a very implausible claim, especially since, we are told, the operators were able to reach everyone else (230-31).

Also, as we saw earlier, Laura Brown of the FAA seemed to have independent knowledge about when this teleconference started---which suggests that the FAA was reached.

Why was the FAA-initiated teleconference equally worthless? The problem here, the Commission claimed, was that the officer at the NMCC said that 'the information was of little value' so he did not pay attention (234).

However, even if we could believe that no one at the Pentagon was monitoring the call, Laura Brown's memo had said that in addition to the phone bridge set up by the FAA with the Pentagon, the 'Air Force liaison to the FAA . . . established contact with NORAD on a separate line.'

So even if no one at the Pentagon was paying attention, the military still would have received the information. Her memo said, moreover, that '[t]he FAA shared real-time information . . . about . . . all the flights of interest' (183), and the Commission itself agrees that by 9:34, FAA headquarters knew about the hijacking of Flight 93, so it was a 'flight of interest.'

The Commission's claim is, therefore, flatly contradicted by this memo, which was read into the Commission's record.

What about the White House videoconference, which was run by Richard Clarke?

The Commissioners say: 'We do not know who from Defense participated' (210). But this claim is completely unbelievable. One problem is that it contradicts the Commission's assurance that 'the right people' were not involved in this conference: How could they know this if they did not know who was involved?

The main problem, however, is simply that the claim is absurd.

Surely any number of people at the Pentagon could have told the Commissioners who participated in Clarke's videoconference. Simpler yet, they could have looked at Clarke's book, Against All Enemies, which became a national best seller during the Commission's hearings. It clearly states that the participants from the Pentagon were Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and General Richard Myers, Acting Chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (210-12). [21] It also reports that the FAA was represented by its top official, Jane Garvey.

And if these were not 'the right people,' who would have been?

The Commission's attempt to prove that the military could not have learned about Flight 93 from this videoconference is even more explicitly contradicted by Clarke, who reports that at about 9:35, Jane Garvey reported on a number of 'potential hijacks,' which included 'United 93 over Pennsylvania' (232).

Therefore, more than 25 minutes before Flight 93 crashed, according to Clarke, both Myers and Rumsfeld heard from the head of the FAA that Flight 93 was considered a potential hijack.

The Commission's tales about FAA incompetence and worthless teleconferences are, therefore, directly contradicted by Laura Brown's memo and Richard Clarke's book. Their combined testimony implies that the Commission's main claim--that '[b]y the time the military learned about the flight, it had crashed'--is a bald-faced lie.


Cheney's Arrival at the Shelter Conference Room

To recall where we are:

The Commission's first major claim is that the US military could not have shot down Flight 93 because it did not know about the hijacking of this flight until after it crashed at 10:03.

The Commission's second main point, to which we now turn, is that the authorization to shoot planes down was not issued until several minutes after 10:03.

In support of this point, the Commission claims that Vice President Cheney, who was known to have issued the shoot-down authorization from the shelter conference room under the White House, did not get down there until about almost 10:00, 'perhaps at 9:58' (241). This claim, however, is doubly problematic.

One problem is that this claim is not supported by any documentation. The Commission says that the Secret Service ordered Cheney to go downstairs 'just before 9:36'; that Cheney entered the underground corridor at 9:37; that he then, instead of going straight to the shelter conference room at the other end of the corridor, spent some 20 minutes calling the president and watching television coverage of the aftermath of the strike on the Pentagon (241). This timeline is said to be based on Secret Service alarm data showing that the Vice President entered the underground corridor at 9:37. However, The 9/11 Commission Report then says that this 'alarm data . . . is no longer retrievable' (244).

We must, therefore, simply take the Commission's claim on faith. And this is very difficult, since the Commission's claim is contradicted by every prior report.

A White House photographer, who was an eyewitness, and various newspapers, including the New York Times, said that Cheney went below shortly after 9:00. Richard Clarke's account suggests that Cheney went below before 9:15 (242). Even Cheney himself, speaking on 'Meet the Press' five days after 9/11, indicated that he was taken downstairs at about that time (243).

The Commission, showing its usual disdain for evidence that contradicts its story, makes no mention of any of these reports.

The most dramatic contradiction of the Commission's timeline was provided by Norman Mineta. In open testimony to the Commission itself, he said, as we saw earlier, that when he got to the underground shelter at 9:20, Cheney was already there and fully in charge. The Commission, insisting that Cheney did not get there until almost 10:00, simply omitted any mention of this testimony in its Final Report. But Mineta's testimony is still available for anyone to read. [22]

We can say with a very high level of confidence, therefore, that the Commission's account is a lie.

The Time of the Shoot-Down Authorization

The same is true of the Commission's claim that the shoot-down authorization was not issued until after 10:10.

In making this claim, the Commission tells a tale of yet another incredible error made by the FAA. Flight 93, according to the Commission, crashed at 10:03 (249-50). And yet sometime between 10:10 and 10:15, the Commission claims, the FAA told the military that Flight 93 was still headed towards Washington and was, in fact, only 80 miles out.

Once again, FAA headquarters managed to call the military only when it had false information.

In any case, we are told, the military requested permission to engage an aircraft and Cheney immediately gave the authorization (237). The implication is that the military could not possibly have shot down Flight 93, since it had crashed about 10 minutes earlier.

However, the Commission's new timeline is again contradicted by several previous reports.

First, although the Commission says that Richard Clarke did not receive the shoot-down authorization until 10:25, Clarke himself says that he received it some 35 or minutes earlier, at 9:45 or 9:50 (240).

Second, the story of Cheney's giving permission to engage an aircraft that was 80 miles out originally appeared in stories published shortly after 9/11. In these stories, the permission was given earlier, when Flight 93 truly was still aloft, after which an F-16 was sent in pursuit (239).

That original account is supported, moreover, by several reports stating that prior to crashing, Flight 93 was being tailed by US military fighters. One such report came from CBS; another came from a flight controller who had ignored an order not to talk to the media; and one such report even came from Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz (238-39).

Evidently the Commission felt that if it could ignore statements from the secretary of transportation and even the vice president, it could also ignore a statement by the deputy secretary of defense.

In any case, the Commission's timeline, besides being contradicted by all those reports, is also contradicted by James Bamford's account, which is based on a transcript from ABC News.

According to this account, Cheney's authorization was transmitted to Colonel Marr at NEADS, who then 'sent out word to air traffic controllers to instruct fighter pilots to destroy the United jetliner.' Marr reportedly said: 'United Airlines Flight 93 will not be allowed to reach Washington, D.C.' (238). But the Commission simply tells its new tale as if this report had never been broadcast.

The Commission's account is contradicted, finally, by reports that the shoot-down actually occurred.

Major Daniel Nash, one of the two F-15 pilots sent to New York City from Otis, later reported that after he returned to base, he was told that a military F-16 had shot down an airliner in Pennsylvania (239).

That rumor was so widespread that during General Myers' interview with the Senate Armed Services Committee on September 13, 2001, chairman Carl Levin said that 'there have been statements that the aircraft that crashed in Pennsylvania was shot down,' adding: 'Those stories continue to exist' (151).

Besides ignoring all these reports, the Commission also ignored reports from people who lived near the spot where the airliner came down. These reports spoke of missile-like noises, sightings of a small military airplane, debris falling from the airliner miles from its crash site, and the discovery of part of an engine far from the site (151).

There is, in sum, an enormous amount of evidence suggesting that the FAA did notify the military about Flight 93;

that Cheney went down to the underground shelter about 45 minutes earlier than the Commission claims;

that he gave the shoot-down authorization about 25 minutes earlier than the Commission claims;

and that military jets went after and shot-down Flight 93.

It would appear that if some committee had set out to construct a fable about Flight 93, every part of which could be easily falsified, it could not have improved on the Commission's tale.

And yet our mainstream media have not reported any of these obvious falsehoods.


SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

The Portrait of FAA Incompetence

The Commission, as we have seen, has attempted to exonerate the military for its failure to prevent the attacks of 9/11. According to the Commission, accounts suggesting that the military was notified in time to respond 'overstated the FAA's ability to provide the military with timely and useful information that morning' (255).

In its effort to correct that alleged overstatement, the Commission gave us a picture of incredible incompetence at every level of the FAA. We read of flight controllers who, instead of following instructions to treat every possible emergency as an actual one, would not respond after seeing two or even all three of the standard signs of a hijacking. We read of controllers who told the military that airplanes that had already crashed were still aloft and headed towards Washington. We read of officials at FAA headquarters who consistently refused to call the military--unless, of course, the airplane to be reported was merely a phantom.

This portrait of rampant incompetence by FAA officials is contradicted by several facts.

One such fact is NORAD's timeline of September 18, 2001, which indicates that the FAA responded slowly but not nearly as slowly as the Commission now claims.

A second fact is Laura Brown's memo of 2003, which says that the FAA was on the telephone with the military from about 8:50 on, talking about all flights of interest.

A third fact is that the FAA was called on to carry out an unprecedented operation that day: grounding all the aircraft in the country. And yet, the Commission itself says, the FAA 'execut[ed] that unprecedented order flawlessly' (272-73).

Is it plausible that FAA personnel, on the same day that they carried out an unprecedented task so flawlessly, would have failed so miserably with a task--asking the military to intercept problematic flights--that they had been carrying out about 100 times a year (140)? [23]

It would seem, therefore, that the first chapter of The 9/11 Commission Report is one long lie. As I have shown elsewhere, moreover, that is true of the report as a whole. [24]

Crisis and Challenge

This conclusion has, of course, frightening implications, because it is hard to imagine why the Commission would have engaged in such deceit except to cover up the fact that the attacks of 9/11 were orchestrated by forces within our own government, including our armed forces.

And if that is the case, then our country is in even worse shape than already evident through the Downing Street Memos, which revealed that the administration had fixed the intelligence used to justify the war in Iraq.

As Burns Weston, a professor of law, has said, we now have 'a disparity between official 9/11 'spin' and independently researched 9/11 fact so glaring as to suggest the possibility of a constitutional crisis unlike anything our country has ever known.' [25]

Overcoming this crisis must surely be the main task before us as American citizens today, because it is likely that, unless we can overcome this one, all the related crises--growing militarism and imperialism, growing plutocracy, increasing poverty in our country and around the world, increasing destruction of our planet's ecosystem, and so on--will simply continue to get worse.

The first step in overcoming our constitutional crisis is to have this crisis acknowledged.

This is why the 9/11 truth movement is in one respect the most important movement in our country and even in our world today. This movement has accomplished its first task--providing evidence strong enough to convince anyone with an even slightly open mind that the official story is a lie. [26]

What is now needed is for this fact to be publicly recognized.

The main reason why this fact is not yet publicly recognized is that the mainstream media have thus far failed to deal with this issue. Although they have reported on a few of the falsehoods in the official account, they have thus far failed not only to discuss any of the evidence pointing to official complicity but even to expose any of the obvious problems in The 9/11 Commission Report, such as those mentioned in the present essay.

If the Commission has created a new tale about the military's response that contradicts what the military had been saying since September 18, 2001; if the Commission has suppressed Laura Brown's memo and Norman Mineta's testimony; if the Commission has contradicted statements by Richard Clarke, Paul Wolfowitz, Vice President Cheney, and three high-ranking NORAD officials--Captain Michael Jellinek, Colonel Robert Marr, and General Larry Arnold--it seems elementary that our news organizations should report these contradictions.

I cannot, at least, imagine how anyone from the mainstream media could support the contention that they should not report such contradictions.

Exposing such contradictions could, of course, lead to exposing evidence that the Bush-Cheney administration had prior knowledge of, and perhaps even orchestrated, the attacks of 9/11, which would mean that the whole post-9/11 'war on terror' has been based on deceit.

I cannot imagine how anyone in the media could marshal a principled argument to the effect that, if that is true, the media are not obligated to report the relevant evidence.

Unfortunately, of course, principle is often over-ruled by other considerations. But we can hope that even the corporate owners of the mainstream media now realize that 9/11 has been used to justify policies that have greatly weakened our country and undermined its reputation and credibility in most of the world.

And we can hope that they will, on the basis of this realization, put the welfare of our country and our planet ahead of any considerations that would prevent them from allowing the press to carry out its most important task as the Fourth Estate: exposing high crimes in high places.

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Footnotes:

1 David Ray Griffin, The 9/11 Commission Report: Omissions and Distortions (Northampton: Interlink Books, 2005)--henceforth sometimes cited simply as O&D.

2 The DVD, prepared by Ken Jenkins, is entitled 'Truth and Politics: Unanswered Questions about 9/11.' It is available at http://septembereleventh.org/donations.php and from KenJenkins@aol.com.

The lecture has been transcribed (with slight modifications) by Ian Woods and published as 'Truth and Politics of 9/11: Omissions and Distortions of The 9/11 Commission Report' in Global Outlook), Issue 10 (Spring-Summer 2005), 45-56.

3 The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, Authorized Edition (New York: W. W. Norton, 2004).

4 Reminder: All parenthetical references in the text are to Griffin, The 9/11 Commission Report: Omissions and Distortions.

5 llarion Bykov and Jared Israel, 'Guilty for 9-11: Bush, Rumsfeld, Myers, Section 1: Why Were None of the Hijacked Planes Intercepted?' (www.emperors-clothes.com/indict/911page.htm).

This essay is listed in the Table of Contents under 'Evidence of high-level government conspiracy in the events of 9-11.'

6 'NORAD's Response Times,' September 18, 2001 (available at www.standdown.net/noradseptember182001pressrelease.htm).

7 That this alleged phone call took 8 minutes is an inference from the fact that NEADS was supposedly notified about Flight 11 shortly before 8:38 whereas the scramble order was not given until 8:46 (The 9/11 Commission Report, 20).

8 The 9/11 Commission Report (Ch. 1, note 103) cites 'Aircraft Piracy (Hijacking) and Destruction of Derelict Airborne Objects,' which was issued June 1, 2001. This document in turn cites Directive 3025.15, issued in 1997, which contains the statement quoted in the text.

The idea that no standard procedures should prevent immediate responses in emergency situations is also stated in other places in the document of June 1, 2001. Section 4.4, after saying that the secretary of defense retains approval authority for various types of support, concludes by saying: 'Nothing in this Directive prevents a commander from exercising his or her immediate emergency response authority as outlined in DoD Directive 3025.1.'

And Section 4.5 begins with these words: 'With the exception of immediate responses under imminently serious conditions, as provided in paragraph 4.7.1., below. . . . ' I have discussed this issue at greater length in the Afterword to the second edition of David Ray Griffin, The New Pearl Harbor: Disturbing Questions about the Bush Administration and 9/11 (Northampton: Interlink Books, 2004)---henceforth cited as NPH.

9 Tom Flocco, 'Rookie in the 9-11 Hot Seat?' tomflocco.com, June 17, 2004 (http://tomflocco.com/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=65).

Flocco adds that Laura Brown later e-mailed him to say that that teleconference had not started until about 8:45, but Flocco suspects that her earlier statement, made to him while they were both present at the first hearing of the 9/11 Commission, was closer to the truth than her later statement, which she made 'after returning to her office and conferring with superiors.'

Flocco's belief that the 8:20 time was correct was, he says, reinforced by a source in the Department of Transportation who told him that phone bridges, linking officials from NORAD, the Secret Service, the Department of Defense, and the Department of Transportation, were established at 8:20 (Tom Flocco, '9-11 Probe Continues to Bypass Executive Branch Testimony,' tomflocco.com, October 13, 2003 (http://tomflocco.com/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=10). See my discussion in O&D 187.

10 This memo is available at www.911truth.org/article.php?story=2004081200421797.

11 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, May 23, 2003 (http://www.911commission.gov/archive/hearing2/9-11Commission_Hearing_2003-05-23.htm).

12 Air War over America: Sept. 11 Alters Face of Air Defense Mission (Public Affairs: Tyndall Air Force Base, 2003), by Leslie Filson (Foreword by Larry K. Arnold).

13 Still another problem is that earlier, when the Commission was explaining why no fighters were scrambled in time to intercept Flight 11, it said that NEADS had to call General Arnold to get permission. But this time, we are told, NEADS simply issued the order, without calling General Arnold. This undermines the Commission's claim that the call to Arnold was necessary in relation to the earlier flight.

14 Quoting Laura Brown, 'FAA Communications with NORAD On September 11, 2001' (available at http://www.911truth.org/article.php?story=2004081200421797).

15 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, May 23, 2003 (http://www.911commission.gov/archive/hearing2/9-11Commission_Hearing_2003-05-23.htm).

16 The idea that military officials knew about Flight 77 long before the Pentagon was struck is also supported by a New York Times story published four days after 9/11, which began: 'During the hour or so that American Airlines Flight 77 was under the control of hijackers, up to the moment it struck the west side of the Pentagon, military officials in a command center on the east side of the building were urgently talking to . . . air traffic control officials about what to do' (Matthew Wald, 'After the Attacks: Sky Rules; Pentagon Tracked Deadly Jet but Found No Way to Stop It,' New York Times, September 15, 2001).

17 Quoting 'Statement of Secretary of Transportation Norman Y. Mineta before the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, May 23, 2003' (available at www.cooperativeresearch.org/timeline/2003/commissiontestimony052303.htm).

18 Page 9 of The 9/11 Commission Report says 9:34. But 9:36 is the time given on pages 27 and 34, and it is the time that allows the Commission to claim that the military 'had at most one or two minutes to react to the unidentified plane approaching Washington' (34).

19 Still another thing ignored by the report is the US military's prodigious radar systems. The website for one of these systems, called PAVE PAWS, says that it is 'capable of detecting and monitoring a great number of targets that would be consistent with a massive SLBM [Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile] attack' ('PAVE PAWS, Watching North America's Skies, 24 Hours a Day' (www.pavepaws.org). The PAVE PAWS system is surely not premised on the assumption that those SLBMs would have transponders. The claim that the military did not know about an aircraft approaching the Pentagon is, accordingly, absurd.

After the strikes on the WTC, the US military, if the attacks of 9/11 had genuinely been surprise attacks carried out by foreigners, would have been on the highest state of alert and would not have hesitated to shoot down any unauthorized and unidentified aircraft approaching Washington.

And as to the capability to do this, even if for some reason Andrews did not have fighters on alert that morning, the website of the Congressional Budget Office informs us that, in Fred Burks' summary statement, 'ICBMs [Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles] travel at speeds up to 6 to 7 kilometers per second (approximately 14,000 miles per hour)' and can hence take down 'an ICBM in a matter of minutes' (Burks, 'Billions on Star Wars Missile Defense Can't Stop Four Lost Airliners on 9/11' (www.wanttoknow.info/911starwars), citing 'Alternatives for Boost-Phase Missile Defense,' July 2004 (http://www.cbo.gov/showdoc.cfm?index=5679&sequence=1&from=0).

20 The 9/11 Commission Report, 30, 31, 34, 38, 44.

21 The Commission's professed inability to discover the identity of the Pentagon participants, along with its neglect of Clarke's account, may have something to do with the fact that it endorsed General Myers' quite different account of his whereabouts, according to which he was up on Capitol Hill at the time. The Commission also endorsed an account of Rumsfeld's movements that is quite different from Clarke's account (O&D 217-19).

22 'Statement of Secretary of Transportation Norman Y. Mineta before the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, May 23, 2003.'

23 The Calgary Herald (Oct. 13, 2001) reported that NORAD scrambled fighters 129 times in 2000; the FAA reported 67 scrambles between September 2000 and June 2001 (FAA News Release, August 9, 2002).

24 See The 9/11 Commission Report: Omissions and Distortions and, for a brief summary, 'The 9/11 Commission Report: A 571-Page Lie,' 9/11 Visibility Project, May 22, 2005 (http://www.septembereleventh.org/newsarchive/2005-05-22-571pglie.php).

25 This statement is in Weston's blurb for The 9/11 Commission Report: Omissions and Distortions.

26 Overviews of this evidence are provided in my two books. Also, in 'The Destruction of the World Trade Center: Why the Official Account Cannot Be True,' I have laid out the case against the official story about the collapses of the WTC buildings much more fully than before.

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Copyright David Ray Griffin.
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